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Abstract: Why have China’s petrochemical and steel industries behaved so differently in seeking 
trade protection through antidumping measures? We argue that the patterning of antidumping 
actions is best explained in terms of the political economy of economic restructuring in pillar 
industries and its effect on industry structures.  In the petrochemical industry, the shift toward 
greater horizontal consolidation and vertical integration reduces the collective action problems 
associated with antidumping petitions among upstream companies. It also weakens downstream 
companies lobbying in favor of the general protection of highly integrated conglomerates.  In the 
steel industry, by contrast, national industrial policy in the absence of exogenous economic shocks 
fails to weaken local state interests sufficiently.  Fragmented upstream and downstream channels 
instead persist, with strong odds against upstream suppliers waging a successful defense of material 
interests.   
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The idea of trade liberalization as a more efficient means of national economic 
development has been at the center of an important shift in the role of national governments in 
setting industrial policy.  Rather than “picking winners” and protecting infant industries, reducing 
tariffs and other barriers to international trade took center stage.  But national governments still 
have an important role to play in assuring that the economic interests of domestic industries are not 
compromised through the unfair trade actions of international competitors. 
Anti-dumping (AD) measures remain a critical arena for such government advocacy. Now 
operating within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and national law, such 
measures begin with the initiating petition of firms alleged to be injured.  Worldwide, the steel and 
petrochemical sectors continue to be primary targets, accounting for 29 percent and 20 percent of 
total AD investigations respectively between 1995 and 2009.  
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995, China has been the top target of AD measures 
worldwide with 761 Chinese products being investigated between 1995 and 2009.  Developing 
countries, India especially, have initiated the majority of cases. Consistent with the global trend, 
China’s steel and petrochemical products are also the top two targets of AD investigation. They 
account for 23 percent and 20 percent of total AD investigations respectively initiated by other 
countries (WTO 2010).  
China’s own use of AD investigation against imports, in contrast, has been relatively 
modest until recently. As the second largest import market, China is only the fifth most frequent 
user of AD tools with 178 investigations being initiated and 130 measures being imposed between 
1998 and 2009 (WTO 2010). While tempting to believe that China is using AD tools solely for 
strategic purpose, including retaliation against countries taking AD actions against its own exports, 
the actual pattern of China’s AD investigations against imports begs for a different explanation.  A 
stunning 66 percent of China’s AD investigations were directed against petrochemical imports. The 3 
 
steel industry, in contrast, only initiated 5 percent of AD investigations during this period (Bown 
2010).  
Given this, the use of AD tools in China seems driven by something other than retaliation 
or even national industrial strategy.   After all, the Chinese government identifies both the 
petrochemical and the metallurgy sectors as “pillar” industries or key sources of economic growth, 
strategic competitiveness, and conceivably then equally worthy of protection (Lin 2008, Sun 2007).  
Over the past few decades, the petrochemical and metallurgy sectors have been targeted for 
numerous restructuring initiatives and government aid, including subsidies and credit which aim to 
enhance their international competitiveness. 
Indeed, large state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) remain the dominant AD petitioners 
in both industries. Concretely, as shown in Table 1, 42 out of 57 AD petitioners in the 
petrochemical industry were SOEs or corporations controlled by the state.  Further, more than half 
of them are subsidiaries of four largest conglomerates.  In the steel industry, all six petitioners were 
SOEs, with five of them being directly controlled by the central government. Nonetheless, as Table 
1 shows, petrochemical producers are better able to muster their defenses than those in the 
metallurgy sector.   How are we to explain this outcome?    
(Table 1 about here) 
In this paper, we argue that AD investigations, or lack thereof, are best explained in terms 
of the political economy of economic restructuring in China and its effect on a domestic industry’s 
structure.  Concretely, we show that national industrial policy in the absence of exogenous 
economic shocks fails to weaken local state interests sufficiently enough to facilitate industrial 
consolidation along the lines which Beijing intends.  Fragmented upstream and downstream 
channels instead persist, with strong odds against upstream suppliers being able to wage a 
successful defense of material interests.  In other words,  rather than serving as a defense against 4 
 
global competition, strong local interests in China seem to be facilitating it.  They do so by getting 
in the way of the kinds of industrial consolidation which seem necessary to wage successful battles 
through anti-dumping mechanisms.   
  Building off this, we find that the patterning of AD investigations in China is best explained 
in terms of whether the central government was able to restructure designated priority industries in 
its preferred direction, meaning greater vertical integration and strengthened central state control.   
Where successful, resulting industry consolidation reduces the collective action problems 
commonly associated with AD petitions in upstream industries, particularly as too many players 
make it hard for any one firm to demonstrate injury.   Such consolidation also weakens downstream 
industry lobbying in favor of general protection for highly integrated conglomerates.  This 
integrated structure now exists in the petrochemical sector.  It remains woefully absent in the 
metallurgy sector where a highly fragmented market structure persists to the great frustration of 
Chinese policymakers.    
For this reason, patterns of AD investigations in China over the past decade or so should 
not be read as mere protectionist reaction to a WTO-mandated liberalization of tariffs (Bown 2007) 
or even “politics-as-usual” in U.S.-China economic relations.    We contend instead that existing 
patterns of AD investigations in China mainly reflect how firms may respond to economic 
challenges in the context of structural constraints.   In so doing, our point is not to dismiss a role 
for economic or political interests as motivating factors, but rather to suggest that in their own right 
they cannot explain fully the patterns which exist.   
Our finding on the effect of industry structure extends current work on the political 
economy of business-government relations and trade policy in China in three important ways (e.g., 
Steinfeld 1998; Zeng 2004; Kennedy 2005; Mertha 2005; Tsai 2007).  First, we demonstrate that 
domestic business interest groups can influence state policy outcomes in China.  Second, we show 5 
 
that their ability to do so is closely related to resolution of collective action problems.  Finally, by 
focusing on the root cause of divergence between central government policy goals and industry 
structure, our research makes explicit that de facto Chinese industrial strategy is a far less 
coordinated political outcome than the increasingly popular idea of “China, Inc.” suggests. 
To make our case, the paper consists of six sections. The first section reviews related 
literature on sources of variation in AD actions.  The second section compares major characteristics 
in China’s steel and petrochemical industries, assessing how well existing literature explains their 
distinct pattern of AD petitions. The third section presents the institutional framework of China’s 
own antidumping law, illustrating why it works against fragmented upstream industries. The fourth 
section discusses the evolution of state sector in China’s economic restructuring, explaining why 
SOEs have been so dominant in using AD measures.  The fifth section discusses how features of 
the Chinese state bureaucracy impinge on the government’s industrial consolidation goals.  Against 
this backdrop, we find that exogenous shocks, something which is typically depicted as unhinging 
national development goals, appear instead the unintended friend of industrial policy planners in 
China. The last section is the conclusion. 
 
Industrial Variation in Antidumping Actions: Existing Explanations 
What explains industrial variation in the pursuit of AD protection? Much like related 
literature on trade policy preferences, AD actions are largely explained in the international political 
economy and economics literature in terms of material interests. Firms with extensive international 
linkages, for example, are found to prefer lower trade barriers (Milner 1987, Hathaway 1998), while 
an increase in import penetration increases incentives for import-competing domestic industries to 
lobby for protection.  In addition, strategic intentions, problems of collective action, and the 
distributional consequences of AD duties have been shown to influence patterns of AD actions.    6 
 
First, turning to strategic intentions, some studies have found that the cost of retaliation 
trumps assumed benefits of AD protection against an import-competing product.  Conversely, 
export-oriented industries may demand retaliatory protection as a means  to pry open foreign 
markets (Milner & Yoffie 1987, Gawanda & Hansen 1999).  Likewise, it is not uncommon to see a 
country using AD tools in a “tit-for-tat” fashion to retaliate against attacks on its own domestic 
firms or oppose cases filed against countries that are important export markets (Prusa & Skeath 
2001, Blonigen & Bown 2003).    
Second, collective action problems may prove too daunting, diminishing a firm’s incentive 
to lobby for protection.  AD measures, after all, are collective goods of a sort but the burden of 
expending resources to procure this trade relief usually falls on a few firms only.   In most countries, 
petitioners for AD investigations typically must represent a major portion of a domestic industry.  
In this way, they demonstrate ‘injury’ to a sector, and not just to a given firm.  These terms, 
however, are not so easily achieved in markets where no firm dominates market share or can easily 
monitor others.   Fragmented markets also lower the cost of free riding, making any given firm all 
the more hesitant to foot the heavy bills associated with filing a case and collecting evidence. 
Supporting this, Busch and Reinhardt (1999) find that geographically concentrated industries tend 
to exhibit greater political motivation and receive relief from imports because spatial proximity 
bolsters capacity for collective action. Goldstein and Martin (2000) also find that when a given firm 
knows that their lobbying for protection will work, they are more willing to bear a higher cost to 
resolve collective action problems.   Supporting this finding, it appears that large firms are more 
politically active, and also benefit disproportionally from governmental protection (Schuler 1996).   
Finally, the distributional consequences of AD duties have been shown to determine an 
industry’s demand for protection. When such transactions are mediated through market-based 
contracts, buyers and sellers within the same sector often have conflicting interests.  Resulting AD 7 
 
duties, for example, offer private gains to domestic upstream producers, but at the expense of 
downstream industries and consumers.  Looking at the petrochemical and steel industries in 
particular, Krupp and Skeath (2002) find that the negative effect on downstream industries was 
indeed substantial, particularly given the importance of steel and petroleum as intermediate inputs.  
For this reason, downstream producers have every reason to lobby hard against AD protections.  
They are, after all, left to bear the cost in terms of narrowed profits and in the worst case in the 
form of layoffs and firm closures.  Hoekman and Leidy (1992) do also find, however, that 
downstream sectors will support upstream protection if it significantly increases the probability that 
the downstream sector will gain protection in return.  No matter how downstream agents behave, 
Sleuwaegen et al. (1998) find that upstream industry AD petitions are more likely when 
concentration in the downstream industry is low.  
Pulling these pieces together, existing literature predicts that only industries with a small 
number of lead upstream producers can wage successful battles against imports for three reasons. 
They can best overcome industry-specific collective action problems, are best able to establish 
“injury,” and seem most willing to bear the  uneven costs associated with pursuit of an AD petition.   
More broadly, existing literature makes clear that a firm’s understanding of appropriate 
industrial strategy is a dynamic outcome, which relates to how a firm understands the political basis 
of its position within both domestic and global supply chains.  For this reason, the composition of 
economic interests is irreducible to objective material conditions.  As Woll (2008) notes instead, 
governments have a role to play, influencing how a firm understands its economic interests, and 
consequently the position to take on trade liberalization and other international political economic 
issues.  The China case makes this point especially clear. 
 
Common Pasts, A Divergent Present: The Petrochemical and Steel Industries 8 
 
How well do the above factors explain AD actions in the Chinese steel and petrochemical 
industries? At first glance, positional differences in global markets seem critical.  China’s status as a 
net steel exporter and net petrochemical importer could have led the former to resist AD actions, 
while the other pursued it vigorously over the past ten to twelve years.   Table 2 indicates, however, 
that their structural economic positions were in fact rather similar before 2006.  Both industries had 
imported significantly more than they exported.   A 90 percent increase in steel exports between 
2005 and 2006 dramatically shifted the steel industry from a net importer to a net exporter.  Prior 
to this, the steel and chemical industries experienced import surges between 1999 and 2003 (Zeng 
2007).  
(Table 2 about here) 
Despite these similarities and later shifts in international exposure both industries have been 
consistent in their pattern of AD petitioning over the past decade. As such, import penetration 
alone does not fully explain patterns of AD cases.   At best, the degree of penetration strongly 
indicates a material interest in protection, but in no way fully predicts behavior.  In fact, the 
petrochemical and steel industries both faced tariff reduction schedules as a part of China’s WTO 
accession.  Nonetheless, AD petitions in the petrochemical sector quickly became far more 
prevalent. 
The national government, as both as majority shareholder and market regulator, plays a 
heavy role in both sectors as well, particularly in upstream firms.  Elsewhere, this pattern is 
associated with strong protectionist impulses, including AD petitioning against related imports.  
Indeed, Chinese steel and petrochemical goods have been the subject of a large number of AD 
investigations in other countries. Yet predicted industry-driven retaliatory impulses have not 
unfolded in China to degrees found elsewhere.    9 
 
                                                
 The geographic distribution of China’s steel and the petrochemical industries also does not 
mirror predicted trends.  In terms of the share of top five provinces in total industrial output, steel 
production (55 percent) is more geographically concentrated than petroleum processing (46 percent) 
but less so than the chemical products (60 percent), as shown in Table 3.  Moreover, coastal 
provinces Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, and Liaoning all have large bases in both the steel and 
petrochemical production but firms within these provinces have not been significant players in AD 
petitions.   All to say, geographical concentration does not seem to be the driving factor behind AD 
action within China’s steel and petrochemical industries 
(Table 3 about here) 
We find instead that industry structure, understood as both ownership form and degree of 
vertical integration, is relevant.  Much like other sectors, both the steel and petrochemical industries 
in China were historically dominated by SOEs.  Their shares declined steadily as a result of China’s 
de facto privatization policies underway since the mid-1990s.  SOE share in the petrochemical 
industry revenue dropped from 66 percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2008.  During that same period, 
SOE share of total steel sector revenues dropped even more rapidly, going from 74 percent to 44 
percent, as shown in Table 4.  
(Table 4 about here) 
Several distinct features emerged alongside this process of declining state ownership.  To 
begin, the petrochemical industry, while having four times as many companies as the steel industry, 
continues to be dominated by four distinct, vertically-integrated state-owned corporations—China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and Sinochem Group.
1  These giant 
 
1 While all these four giants are integrated conglomerates which have a wide range of businesses, they have different 
advantages inherited from their SOE predecessors: CNPC is the largest oil and gas producer; Sinopec is the largest 
refining and petrochemical producer; CNOOC is the largest offshore oil and gas producer; Sinochem is the largest 
petrochemical trading corporation.  10 
 
                                                
companies not only operate the vast majority of China’s refineries, but also produce much of 
China’s oil and largely control the retail distribution of gasoline.  Their revenues account for more 
than half of revenues of the entire petrochemical sector, yielding to a de facto oligopolistic market 
structure.  
The steel industry is a rather different story.  As of 2008, there were over 8,000 steel 
companies in China.  Most of these companies, however, are private and scattered throughout to 
nearly every province of China.   Although of small and medium-size scale, these newer firms have 
continuously chipped away at the central government’s goal of industry consolidation.  In terms of 
industrial output, the steel industry is only 20 percent smaller than the petrochemical industry, but 
the total revenue of Baosteel, China’s largest steelmaker, is only 14 percent that of Sinopec, the 
largest petrochemical company.
2  In fact, while output shares of the four largest steelmakers were 
never especially high, now it has now considerably declined, going from 33 percent in 1988 to 22 
percent in 2008.   
A less noticeable but critical difference is the degree of vertical integration existing in each 
sector. Such vertical consolidation enhances an industry’s power within a given market, partly as it 
harmonizes interests between upstream and downstream firms (Williamson 1971). Following a 
standard approach of its calculation (i.e., Fan 2000), we use commodity flow information in the 
Input-Output Table of China to measure the degree of vertical integration between upstream and 
downstream industries in each sector. For each pair of industries i and j, the input-output accounts 
report the value input from industry i in producing industry j’s total output. A larger input-output 
ratio indicates a higher degree of vertical integration between i and j as there is more use of input i 
in the production of output j.   Since our focus is domestic firms, we only report the value of 
domestic intermediate input used in producing outputs in the downstream industries.  
 
2 In 2009, the total revenues of Sinopec and Baosteel were RMB 1392 billion and RMB 195 billion respectively. 11 
 
As shown in Table 5, important differences unfolded in the steel and petrochemical 
industries between 1995 and 2002.  Namely the IO ratio increased in five out of seven downstream 
industries in the petroleum and chemicals industries, while decreasing in six out of eight 
downstream industries in the steel industry.  In other words, the upstream petrochemical industry 
became more integrated with its downstream industries whereas the steel industry became 
increasingly disintegrated with its downstream industries.  
 (Table 5 about here) 
In the case of China’s petrochemical industry, the distribution of SOEs within the sector 
added to the industry’s power. Today, the state holds the stakes in the upstream segment, with 46 
national key SOEs (guojia zhongdian qiye) enjoying political and fiscal privileges from both the central 
and provincial governments. The petrochemical downstream industries, however, only have 43 
national key SOEs.  
The situation is just the opposite in the steel industry where the influence of SOEs is more 
prevalent in downstream industries.  At present, 103 national key SOEs are located in such steel-
consuming industries as automobile, machinery equipment, electronics, and construction.  Each 
industry is adversely affected by AD duties imposed on imported steel products.  In contrast, the 
steel industry itself only has 33 national key SOEs.   
(Table 6 about here) 
The concentrated petrochemical industry faces segmented and distinct downstream markets, 
but with the benefit of considerable industry consolidation.  Highly integrated petrochemical firms, 
in turn, may use their power over unaffiliated downstream firms.  The steel sector, in contrast, has a 
fragmented and disintegrated upstream, no match for fairly strong downstream industries. In next 
section, we explore how industrial structure affects Chinese firms’ use of AD measures through a 
review of China’s AD regulations and institutional arrangement. 12 
 
                                                
 
 
Institutional Framework for Antidumping Investigation in China 
China began to implement its own AD regulations in 1997. The initial regulations were 
replaced in 2001 to bring them into conformity with WTO obligations. These regulations were 
amended again in 2004 after a major administrative restructuring. Now the investigation of AD 
measures is primarily conducted by the newly created Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), but AD 
enforcement still requires a complex coordination among various government agencies.   
Within MOFCOM, two internal agencies are involved in an AD investigation: the Bureau 
of Fair Trade (BOFT), responsible for the determination of the dumping margin; and the 
Investigation Bureau of Injury to the Industry (IBOII), responsible for the determination of 
domestic injury.
3  Both bureaus determine causation, but the BOFT is the agency responsible for 
taking the decision to initiate an investigation.
4 MOFCOM is also responsible for the termination 
and imposition of provisional duties, or the acceptance of a price undertaking.
5  The Tariff 
Commission under the State Council is responsible for the adoption of definitive antidumping 
duties.  Finally, the Customs General Administration collects the duties. 
China’s AD regulations closely resemble international counterparts as well as procedures 
found in the WTO Antidumping Agreement.  That is, a domestic producer makes a request to the 
relevant authority to initiate an AD investigation against a foreign producer on behalf of an entire 
domestic industry. The term “domestic industry” refers to those domestic producers of “like 
 
3 Prior to March 2003, AD determinations were made by the Import and Export Fair Trade Bureau of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and injury determinations by the Industry Injury Investigation 
Bureau of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). 
4 Most developed countries make a division between the determination of dumping and the determination of injury and 
the calculation of dumping margins. For example, in the U.S., the Department of Commerce investigates dumping 
while the International Trade Commission investigates injury.  
5 Price undertakings, as a means of limiting import, are used by a government to pressure a foreign firm to raise the 
export price in order to avoid the imposition of AD duties on its sales. It has replaced voluntary export restraints as a 
primary policy tool since the 1990s. 13 
 
                                                
products” within China.  The collective output of the petitioning firms needs to constitute a ‘‘major 
proportion’’ of the total production of “like products,” thus establishing the petitioners’ 
representativeness of an industry.
6  In practice, this means at least 25 percent of a domestic industry 
must support the petition and at least 50 percent of the industry must not oppose it.  If the 
domestic industry is fragmented and includes s a large number of producers, MOFCOM may 
examine the standing of the applicant by using statistically valid sampling methods to determine 
industrial representativeness.
7  
The government then investigates the foreign producers to determine if the allegation is 
valid.  A valid allegation proves such dumping as well as the existence of injury to domestic 
industry.  The causal link between dumping and injury is determined by the reduction in the market 
share of domestic producers and significant undercutting of price by foreign exporters.   Drops in 
domestic manufacturer prices or possibly the prevention of price increases that ought to have 
occurred as a result of domestic production cost are sample indicators of injury.  The designated 
authority may initiate action when these conditions exist. The AD duty imposed under the 
regulations is effective for five years from the date of imposition, unless revoked earlier.  
In practice, China’s AD investigation and enforcement decisions afford great discretionary 
power to the government, with many implementation details subject to case-by-case practice and 
guidelines (Messerlin 2004).  Article 56 of the AD regulations, for example, grants the Chinese 
government the authority to use countervailing measures against ‘discriminatory imposition’ of 
antidumping measures by other countries.  Even though this provision has rarely been invoked, its 
very existence gives the Chinese government the ability to push against AD investigations that 
target China for non-economic reasons (Choi & Gao 2006).  China’s non-market economy status 
 
6 An important issue is that China has modified the definition of “domestic” and “foreign” industry to be consistent 
with WTO requirements. Because the law is aimed at protecting firms that produce within China’s borders, foreign-
invested companies, even wholly foreign-owned enterprises, can apply for relief. (Kennedy 2005, 419) 
7 Provisional Rules on Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigations, Article 7 14 
 
                                                
within the terms of its WTO accession also makes Chinese companies especially easy targets.
8  In 
such trade disputes, they are likely to be found in violation, and partly as a result of what third 
country is chosen as a proxy for Chinese production costs.    
Given this, AD law and related investigations are never too far from political considerations.  
They range from a country’s interest in their reputation as a fair trader to the all-too-common slap 
of retaliatory duties.   In China’s case, there is an added layer to these political considerations that 
says something about its past and continued recognition that regime legitimacy is closely connected 
to its ability to maintain the country’s economic well-being.   
In fact, a public interest clause was added to the 2004 amendment of China’s AD 
regulations, allowing that “interested parties” to an AD action may include reference to the public’s 
interest in evaluating a petition.   The point here is that officials are expected to take into 
consideration not only domestic producers who claim injury from imports, but also the 
consequence of AD duties on other economic actors should they be imposed.  
Such recognition allows national economic goals to remain front and center. That is, at least 
officially, the public interest clause makes AD decisions less biased in favor of domestic producers, 
as the benefits of AD measures to primary-line producers can be outweighed by losses to 
downstream producers and consumers.  In turn, even if dumping, injury, and causation are all 
found to exist, the government might not impose AD measures if the sale of the targeted products 
conforms to the Chinese public interest.  With no specific operational rule on how public interest 
should be considered in AD investigations or of what conclusions should be drawn, the public 
interest clause opens a direct channel for industrial lobbying to play a legitimate role in the AD 
 
8 A report conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the “nonmarket economy” 
status has imposed disadvantage on Chinese products when facing AD investigations. The U.S. Commerce’s 
methodology for calculating AD duties on nonmarket economy products differs from its market economy approach in 
two parts: (1) it uses price information from an appropriate market economy country (surrogate country) to construct a 
normal value of the imported products and (2) it limits eligibility for individual rates to companies that show their 
export activities are not subject to government control. See GAO 2006.  15 
 
                                                
process.  Inn some cases, firms in both upstream and downstream industries are invited to present 
their opinions during the course of an AD investigation.
9  
China’s AD regulations, in other words, encourage firms to pursue activities that procure 
the government’s protection.   We find that vertically-integrated domestic oligopolists are 
particularly well equipped in this regard as they have strong standing on two fronts.  These firms 
are leading agents of national economic development, and thus strongly positioned to claim 
standing as the public’s interest.  By virtue of their market share and scale, they also have an easier 
time establishing standing as representative of a “whole industry” claiming injury.    
On these very grounds, foreign companies operating in China can also win the 
government’s support, whether operating upstream or downstream.   BP China, for example, 
presents itself as playing a critical role in China’s energy security.  Downstream foreign firms link 
their ability to produce low cost finished products with China’s competitiveness in the global 
marketplace.  Today, no small number of foreign firms also claim membership in Chinese trade 
associations, using their position to shape legislation right alongside their domestic counterparts.
10  
In fact, foreign companies have a surprisingly high rate of victory (dismissed AD cases) and partial 
victory (light penalty), making arguments of systematic anti-foreign bias hard to sustain at least in 
this policy realm (Kennedy 2005).  
Either way, foreign or domestic, the story is the same:  powerful businesses in China are 
those which serve government ends.  For this reason, it seems a reasonable prediction that China’s 
SOEs would embrace the central government’s long-standing call for greater consolidation and 
vertical integration.  Turning to the metallurgy and petrochemical industries tells a rather different 
story, one wherein firms have defined their strategies of survival in the context of their immediate 
political environment and its ability to protect them.  Turning to this dynamic and its effect on the 
 
9 Author’s interview, Bureau of Fair Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, July 3, 2009. 
10 One example is Sealed Air, a global packaging company, which in its role as a member of China’s Meatpackers 
Association has been at the forefront of pushing for greater food safety requirements in China. 16 
 
                                                
patterning of AD actions, we argue that exogenous shocks have played an important, if 
unacknowledged role in shaping trade politics in China today.  Concretely, they open the way for 
industrial consolidation within a sector, which otherwise is thwarted by the tight alignment of local 
state and business interests.   
In next section, we look broadly at economic restructuring policies in reform era China, 
showing how they well positioned Chinese SOEs to benefit from AD regulations.  
 
Remaking the Commanding Heights: Economic Restructuring in Post-1978 China  
Economic restructuring in post-1978 China in many ways might be read as an attempt to do 
away with the aftermath of economic autarky which had earlier prevailed.  Celebrated in the Maoist 
era, the self-sufficiency of economic units also led to a good deal of inefficiency.   The industrial 
sector, in particular, was plagued with duplication, outdated technologies, surplus employees, and a 
shortage of supplies and lack of economics of scale.
11  Decades of protection also meant that little 
attention had been paid to issues of quality control and innovation.  As a result, both provincial and 
central state-owned industries were poorly equipped to respond to market forces.    
For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, township-and-village-owned enterprises (TVEs) 
operated instead as the industrial engines of China’s economic development.   Their reasons for 
success also made clear that China’s system of economic governance was itself a cause of economic 
fragmentation.   As a source of economic growth, employment, and local tax revenues, TVEs 
enjoyed considerable protection.  Provincial and sub-provincial governments shielded them from 
non-local competitors, along with SOEs under their jurisdiction.   
At the same time, Chinese economic planners were eager to achieve economies of scale and 
greater vertical integration in leading sectors, ultimately pushing for the creation of business groups.   
 
11 For a general review see Brandt, Rawski and Sutton (2008) 17 
 
By 1991, 7,000 such groups existed.  They were mostly in the form of lend-lease and sub-
contracting relations between rural and urban industries, which did little to alter their relations with 
local and provincial government officials (Nolan 1996).  Moreover, without accompanying reforms 
that addressed the historical role of SOEs, including their provision of housing, pensions, and 
lifetime employment, the central government’s goal of industrial rationalization, including 
bankruptcy in some cases, could not move forward.     
In the early 1990s, local and provincial governments also had little reason to heed such calls.  
Local industries, including those in petrochemicals and steel, benefitted from price controls and 
easy access to bank credit, making them a sure bet for local economic development. Local state 
actors, in other words, had every incentive to create small and medium-sized firms under their 
direct control.  By 1994, however, market and non-market pressures began to build, shifting the 
investment decisions of local government officials.   Specifically, greater control over the 
distribution of credit and improvements in fiscal capacity strengthened central government capacity 
to “pick winners” and save losers, if desired.   With this, mergers and acquisitions got underway; 
along with talk of building national champions becoming ever more prevalent (Nolan 2001).   
Under the slogan of zhuada fangxiao (Grasp the big, let go of the small), Beijing combined 
the privatization of industries with little national security or fiscal importance with the creation of 
state-dominated, oligopolistic shareholding concerns in strategic industries.  A stunning 80 percent 
of small and medium-sized collective enterprises (SMEs) changed their ownership status in the mid 
1990s through corporatization, shareholding, or shift to private management (ADB 2007).   All the 
same, firms having the state as majority shareholder were expected to play a leading role in the 
economy.  
The strategy of “zhuada fangxiao” reflects Beijing’s long-held belief that government is best 
suited to run the commanding heights of the economy.  As a first step, in 1994, the central 18 
 
government chose 100 big and relatively productive enterprises to experiment with the creation of a 
modern enterprise system. These entities, most of which were spun off from the ministries that 
“owned” them under the system of central planning, were now given greater autonomy in drafting 
economic plans, financing their operations, and engaging in foreign trade. They were also 
corporatized with the state as the dominant shareholder.  
The central government later expanded the number of these experimental enterprises to 
300 and provided them a guaranteed credit line and discounted interest rate from state commercial 
banks (China Industry News 2008).   In 1999, the list was expanded again, with 520 national key 
SOEs selected from 26 industries. These SOEs accounted for about half of the assets (55%), 
outputs (43%), profits (48%) and taxes (45%) of China’s industrial sector in 1999 (National 
Economic and Trade Commission 2000).  
Of the 520 national key SOEs, 196 central SOEs (zhongyang qiye), which dominated the 
lifeline industries (mingmai hangye) of the Chinese economy, became the state’s top priority.  They 
were supervised by a newly created State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC).  Through state-owned holding companies that retain dominant shares of these key SOEs, 
SASAC directly controls managerial and board selection and all financial, legal, and corporate 
structure issues for these giant firms (Naughton 2006).  The goal was to “make state control more 
efficient and state enterprises wealthier and more effective at carrying out parallel imperatives of the 
party-state” (Pearson 2007, 720). 
Upon its establishment in 2003, SASAC developed a performance evaluation system to 
rank each central SOE in relation to their reference industrial sector (SASAC 2006).  Largely 
through this evaluation system, SASAC indirectly reinforces the elite status of central SOEs by 
forcing them either to become the dominant firms in their sectors (e.g., become the top three firms) 
or to be taken over (Naughton 2005). By the end of 2009, the total numbers of central SOEs had 19 
 
shrunk to 129 as some smaller and less efficient SOEs were either disbanded or acquired by larger 
ones. SASAC plans to reduce the total number of central SOEs to 100 by the end of 2010, which 
means at least 29 more companies will disappear in 12 months. At the provincial level, there are 
1,028 key SOEs controlled by local SASAC under a similar ownership structure (Huang 2008).  
While Beijing has denied publicly that it intends to reassert control over large swathes of the 
economy in response, the tendency of  “Guojin mintui” (the state advances, the private sector 
recedes) has become increasingly evident (Li 2006).  The economic performance of central SOEs  
has been important in this respect.  In 2002, the year before SASAC was established, 196 central 
SOEs had 7 trillion RMB assets and earned 240 billion RMB of profits.  In 2009, 129 central SOEs 
had 21 trillion yuan assets and earned almost 1 trillion yuan profits (SASAC 2010). The Chinese 
government plans to create 30 to 50 internationally competitive enterprises groups (China Daily 
2006).   More recently, faced with the global economic crisis, Vice-premier Zhang Dejiang 
reportedly urged SOEs “to further expand domestic and international markets... assume the 
responsibility and continue playing the leading role” in the economy (Financial Times 2008).  
Of interest for our purposes is the government’s systematic and consistent effort to make 
Chinese SOEs globally competitive through greater consolidation within sectors, changes in firm 
governance, new government regulatory institutions, and changed reporting relationships.   The 
policies so mentioned, if successfully implemented, address the collective action problems that 
commonly prevent AD petitions from advancing, and offer an alternative point of entry into 
understanding the pattern of AD actions in China over the past decade or so.    
 
Getting it Right: National Industrial Policy and Economic Interests 
In many aspects, the Chinese government’s strategy in promoting consolidation in 
designated priority industries was very similar to that of Korea (Chang 1993, Huang 2002) in that 20 
 
governments often initiated or subsidized mergers and takeovers in order to create “national 
champions.”   There is one key difference, however. SOEs rather than private firms are the primary 
targets of industrial consolidation in China.  Thus, while the private sector has become the main 
engine of China’s economic boom and source of most international trade, it is the state sector 
which continues to have considerable status in the central government’s vision of national 
economic security and development. Given that the central government has pulled together an 
impressive array of administrative and financial mechanisms to encourage cooperation, it also 
seems reasonable that local state government and enterprise agents might see their own prosperity 
and survival in relation to satisfying demands from above.   Nonetheless, resistance to the central 
government’s policy agenda and on-going fragmentation has been the distinguishing feature of the 
steel sector over the past decade.   Steel firms, in turn, remain to this day poorly equipped to 
counter-balance powerful downstream interests which favor competitively priced inputs above all 
else.  Consolidation of the petrochemical sector, in contrast, has allowed lead firms to protect 
themselves against foreign competition.  
The above contrast begs the question of just how Chinese firms understand their economic 
interests, and what allows those interests to shift.  We argue that exogenous shocks have a critical 
role to play.  They need to be considered for two reasons.  
 First, exogenous shocks deeply constrain a local government’s ability to protect area 
businesses as they now face forces beyond their control.  These shocks also possibly worsen 
matters by encouraging local state predatory action in response to declining economic conditions.  
With this change, the channel for central government agents to pursue industry consolidation goals 
only expands.  Once viewed with hostility, mergers andacquisitions,  as well as other shifts in local 
enterprise ownership, are a means of survival for firms in tough times. 21 
 
Second, exogenous shocks have the ability to undercut government legitimacy with great 
efficiency, serving as a stiff reminder that national champions are a channel to economic and 
political security.  As a result, the central government’s drive toward success in this endeavor is a 
persistent feature of government-business relations in China.   Both petrochemical and steel 
industries are considered strategically important industries, but the government initially put the 
former ahead to address energy security concerns.  
Starting with the 8
th Five Year Plan (1991-1995), the petrochemical industry was categorized 
as a pillar industry, guaranteeing it wide-ranging administrative and financial support from the 
government.  In December 2006, SASAC laid out seven industrial sectors over which the 
government should retain “absolute control.”  The petrochemical industry, along with coal, 
electricity, defense, telecom, air transport and ocean shipping, was again included as a priority of 
national economic security.  The year prior, in 2005, the government also established a leading 
group focused on national energy, led by premier Wen Jiabao which aimed to improve 
coordination across industries and ministries. In 2008, the Leading Group on National Energy was 
replaced by the National Energy Commission (NEC) to enhance energy governance and make it 
more transparent. 
The Chinese government has consistently pursued the goal of self-sufficiency in the steel 
sector, but it never regarded the sector as one where the central government retained “absolute 
control.”   Government encouragement had been given instead to the development of SOEs as 
“heavyweights” in the industry, in effect proposing an indirect control mechanism (China Daily 
2006).  These seemingly nuanced differences imply that the central government did not devote the 
same effort to promote giant conglomerates within the steel industry as was the case for 
petrochemicals.  Much however has changed, and in ways that make explicit the relation between 
exogenous shocks and the central government’s ability to constrain local state agents.  We next turn 22 
 
to the interaction effects of exogenous shocks, central and local government relations, and business 
interests to explain the divergence of industrial restructuring in these leading sectors.  
 
Restructuring in the Steel Industry:  
Beginning with the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese government had supported a high 
degree of autarky in steel manufacturing.  Much of it, however, was not suitable as inputs for 
manufacturing higher value-added goods.  The onset of economic reforms, however, gave new 
impetus to local governments to develop and control a captive source of steel to advance local 
industrial development and manufacturing.   China’s existing regulatory apparatus unwittingly aided 
these efforts through a joint administrative structure that allowed local governments to maintain a 
fair degree of control.    
 Adding to this, in 1998, the government downgraded the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
(MMI).  It had been the central line ministry for the steel industry, but was changed to a state 
bureau affiliated to the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), the powerful super-
ministry responsible for industrial policy creation.  At the same time, operational control of all but 
the four major steel SOEs (Baosteel, Ansteel, Wusteel, and Pansteel)were handed over to local 
governments (Sun 2007).  
This devolution of economic powers encouraged local officials to pursue their own 
developmental goals.  In the 9
th and 10
th Five-Year plans period (1996-2005), 19 provinces 
prioritized the steel industry as the pillar industry to promote local economy (Xu & Han 2006).  At 
the same time, the central government’s policy of capacity rationalization and industry 
consolidation within the industry was ignored. Large-scale mergers and takeovers were all-too-rare 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, especially inter-provincial deals.  23 
 
Interestingly, the central government began its consolidation efforts with the assumption 
that market forces would unhinge local state power, when instead rising domestic and international 
market demand served only to strengthen it.  Specifically, in 1994, the central government freed 
steel prices, with hopes that economies of scale might organically emerge.  At the same time, the 
central government continued to set guidance prices for main steel products, partly to restrain 
inflationary pressures (Noland & Yeung 2001).  By the late 1990s, domestic prices fell well below 
global price levels, fueling Chinese steelmakers to expand export capacity at a furious clip.   
(Figure 1 about here) 
During the decade between 1997 and 2006, steel production quadrupled and outstripped 
demand.  Concerned about the over-expansion of steel capacity, the State Council promulgated 
China’s Iron & Steel Development Policy in 2005, again calling for industry consolidation through 
mergers and acquisitions.  This policy was only the second industry-specific development policy to 
appear in post-reform China, having been announced the year after the automotive industry 
development policy.  A key objective was to increase the concentration of steel production by large 
SOEs.  Article 20 specifically called for a strategic reorganization of China’s largest steel producers.  
The goal has been to have  two 30 million-ton and several 10 million-ton level “internationally 
competitive” business groups  emerge within several years time.   No less ambitious is the goal of 
having the ten largest companies account for 50 percent of total production by 2010 and 70 percent 
by 2020 (Xinhua 2005).    
In the face of rising global demand, implementing the policy proved more difficult than 
expected. For example, Shanghai-based Baosteel, China’s largest steelmaker, early on aggressively 
sought out merger targets.  In 2004, talks were underway with Ma’anshan Steel in Anhui, Handan 
Steel in Heibei, and Baotou Steel in Inner Mongolia in 2004.  In each case, provincial government 24 
 
                                                
officials stood in the way.
12  In fact, since 2005, completed mergers mainly occurred within 
provincial borders as shown in Table 6.
13 
(Table 6 about here) 
In effect, economies of scale within the steel sector happened, but not in the direction 
intended by the central government.  Local governments instead found their bargaining power 
strengthened in ways that implicated China’s economic relations with the world.  
  To begin, ever lower prices meant that steel exports from China expanded rapidly.  In 
response to growing complaints from trade partners around the world, the Chinese government cut 
steel export rebates eight times between 2004 and 2007 (China Trade Remedy Information 2007).  
Nonetheless, steel capacity continued to expand, reaching 500 million tons at the end of 2008, or 
what some have estimated as 100 million tons of overcapacity (Guangzhou Daily 2009).  
The rapid expansion of steel production also forced Chinese steelmakers to strike deals 
with foreign suppliers to ensure steady sources of iron ore. As the biggest buyer of iron ore, China 
should have had considerable leverage in negotiations, but here again the failure of the central 
government to consolidate the steel industry resulted in a serious misalignment of its own interests 
and those of leading steelmakers in China.   
To elaborate, the contracted price for imported iron ore is the result of an annual 
negotiation between China’s lead steelmakers (e.g., Baosteel) and the big three miners, Rio Tinto, 
BHP Billiton and Vale.   Once concluded,  China’s 100 largest steelmakers are permitted to import 
iron ore at this contracted price.  The majority of Chinese steelmakers, in other words, can only 
purchase ore on the domestic market at much higher spot-market prices.  
 
12 Anhui provincial province promulgated a “Guideline for Adjusting and Developing Iron & Steel Industry” in May 
2009, indicating that it has no interest in seeing its largest steelmaker merged by Baosteel. Thanks to the push by Hebei 
provincial government, Handan Steel was finally merged with its local rival Tangshan Steel in 2008 (Nanfang 
Metropolitan News 2009).  
13 The formation of Anben Steel, through the merger of two giant steelmakers Anshan and Benxi, had been delayed 
and was eventually implemented in 2005 primarily because they were pushed and coordinated by the same local 
government in Liaoning province. 25 
 
Given this, the largest steelmakers expend more energy securing a hefty import quota than 
they do on ensuring the lowest possible contracted price. They do so knowing that a steady stream 
of profits awaits them through the arbitrage of “leftover” iron ore, sold to smaller domestic 
steelmakers at spot-market prices (Yu & Hu 2009).   As became well known through the Stern Hu-
Rio Tinto case, smaller steelmakers not entitled to import iron ore directly, and unhappy with the 
discrimination, began to unite themselves and negotiate with the foreign miners privately, ultimately 
undermining the bargaining power of the Chinese steel industry (Studwell 2009).  
 
Industrial Restructuring in the Petrochemical Industry 
The petrochemical industry experienced a similar path of decentralization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The dismantling of the Ministry of Petroleum in 1988 and the Ministry of Energy 
in 1992 basically left local governments with primary control of oil fields and petrochemical 
companies in their territories.  Local officials, with their entrepreneurial mindset, invested heavily in 
refinery and petrochemical units to expand production.  External price shocks, however, had a 
dramatic impact, aiding in the consolidation of the petrochemical industry.   
Like steel prices, oil prices had long been controlled by the government and were kept well 
below global price levels.  The global oil price plunge in the mid 1990s, combined with a downward 
trend in the domestic economy, drove both upstream (oil and gas production) and downstream 
(refineries and petrochemical production) in the petrochemical industry into fiscal hardship and 
forced them to adjust.  Indebted local governments, unable to exploit financial resources to bail out 
local SOEs instead became more predatory toward them (Lin 2008).   
This situation gave the central government the opportunity needed to regain its control and 
reorganize the petrochemical industry.  From 1998 to 2000 the visible economic structure of the 
petrochemical industry experienced dramatic change.  In just two years, it was transformed from an 26 
 
                                                
industry composed of many small independent firms into a highly concentrated industry with most 
of its output produced by subsidiaries of the largest petrochemical companies. The restructuring 
transformed the onshore petrochemical industry from a function-oriented structure to a geography-
oriented structure.   An oligopolistic competition was established between two vertically-integrated 
national petrochemical corporations—CNPC and Sinopec.
  Nearly all state-owned oilfields, 
refineries and petrochemical plants subsequently have been incorporated into these two giants.
  
CNPC transferred six oil & gas production plants in southern China to Sinopec.   In exchange, it 
acquired 15 refineries and petrochemical plants in northern China which were originally owned by 
Sinopec.  Local governments gave up the control of provincial and municipal petroleum 
distribution and companies: 15 went to CNPC and 19 to Sinopec (Wu 2002).  
In 2001, the Chinese state began the gradual process of converging Chinese oil prices with 
the global market.  Specifically, the government sets guidance (wholesale) prices based on global 
market prices and allowed retail prices to fluctuate within 8 percent on either side of these guidance 
prices, depending on prevailing international benchmarks.
14  China already had been a net importer 
of oil since 1993, and thanks partly to the convergence of oil prices, the trade imbalance in the 
petrochemical products continued to grow.   
China’s growing need for petroleum and petrochemicals imports implies that downstream 
industries should strongly reject any AD measures, possibly waging a successful campaign against 
them in terms of national development goals.  After all, they ultimately have to bear the expense.   
Likewise, if these imports reflect unmet domestic demand, then upstream firms ostensibly are not 
losing business from international competitors.  What they get instead is a strong market signal to 
enhance efficiencies within their own domestic industry.    
 
14 The international benchmark prices were based on the weighted monthly average of spot physical prices for these 
products in the benchmark Singapore, Rotterdam, and New York Harbor markets (Downs 2006). 27 
 
There seems, in other words, little objective economic reason for there to be such a strong 
record of AD victories in the petrochemical sector, and yet that is exactly the pattern in China.   
Zeng (2007) attributes this to financial losses in the petrochemical sector, where a greater 
concentration of SOEs and greater demand for upfront investments can be found.   While true, 
these factors alone cannot explain why related downstream industries failed to muster an adequate 
defense of their own  material interests.  After all, if enterprises in the steel sector’s downstream can 
wage effective trade policy strategies on grounds of “public interest,” China’s national development 
goals, or a need to manage relations with its foreign investors, then the very same should be true of 
those downstream industries critically dependent on petrochemicals.  They too include a broad 
composition of domestic and foreign economic actors, ranging from garment manufacturers and 
electronics producers to major local and foreign firms with operations in China’s construction 
industry.  
Different, it seems, is the degree of vertical integration which exists in each industry, and 
with it, demonstration of an SOE’s ability to meet Beijing’s national industrial development goals 
through greater market control.   Domestically-manufactured petrochemicals, as earlier illustrated, 
are the source of a good deal more inputs to downstream industries than was ever the case for the 
China’s steel sector and relations with its downstream industries.  Given this, it seems that the cost-
benefit calculation running in China is in terms of a firm’s position within the hierarchy of 
enterprises operating in China, with vertically-integrated national key SOEs having the edge.    
Situating the paucity of AD actions in the steel industry and their relative abundance in the 
chemicals sector from this angle does two things.  It acknowledges the power of business “interest 
groups” (Kennedy 2005, Zeng 2004) to influence outcomes, while simultaneously getting away 
from equating these “interests” with a firm’s position within a global supply chain.   Instead a local 28 
 
                                                
story gets told, and one in which the political economy of economic restructuring and its impact on 
“tiao-kuai” dynamics in China takes center stage.   
From this angle, the global economy’s influence is reflected in the way Beijing implements 
its industrial development plans.  To make this concrete, we offer below two AD cases to illustrate 
our perspective.  Both suggest that the ability of SOEs to protect their material interests is at least 
partly constrained by some indication that they can shepherd successfully national industrial 
development plans.  
 
Steel Safeguard Investigation 
In 2002, the global steel crisis triggered a multi-country surge in steel safeguard 
investigations.
15  China imposed temporary safeguards on imported steel products in response to 
U.S. government’s safeguards (China Trade Remedy Information 2002). In April 2003, five major 
steel producers and the Chinese Association of Iron and Steel Industry jointly filed a petition and 
requested the MOFCOM to impose tariffs on 84 steel products. Within a month, the MOFCOM 
decided to impose temporary safeguard measures of six months on 48 imported steel products, 
which were later extended to three years upon their expiration in November.  The steel prices 
soared, resulting in a rapid increase in capital investments and output in the steel industry in 2003.  
Companies in the downstream sectors suffered, however.   Producers of household 
electronic products such as compressors and microwave ovens reported a 5-10 percent rise of costs 
due to the safeguard measure (Lu 2003).  From January to March 2003, MOFCOM received over 
200 petitions from downstream industries including shipbuilding, automobile, household 
electronics, and machinery pushing MOFCOM to abolish the steel safeguard tariffs (China 
Business News 2003).  Within a month, the government removed most of the products from the 
 
15 For a review of the steel safeguard measures in the U.S. and globally, see Reed 2005. 29 
 
list (Lu 2003).   In November 2003, the MOFCOM terminated all safeguard measures on steel 
products, two years prior to their scheduled termination date.  
This timing, it should be noted, came shortly after the US and EU ended protective tariffs 
imposed on China (AFP 2003).  A similar outcome resulted in the case of stainless steel (Kennedy 
2005), minus the tit-for-tat edge, suggesting that without further integration of the steel industry, 
government officials seem more than willing to accommodate downstream interests. 
 
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) Antidumping Case 
In March 2002, five chemical companies petitioned to the MOFCOM and requested an AD 
investigation on the import of PVC. In September 2003, the Chinese government imposed AD 
duties on the import of PVC originally produced in the U.S., Japan, Russia, Korea, and Taiwan. The 
imposition of AD measures immediately resulted in a 60 percent rise of PVC price, followed by a 
30 percent growth of domestic PVC production, and a sharp decline in imports. The five applicants, 
all of which are key SOEs in their own provinces, benefited significantly from the AD measure. 
Even before the MOFCOM made the final decision on the AD measure, four listed companies on 
the stock market reported their profits more than doubled in the first half of 2003 (China Chemical 
Industry News 2003). 
However, the downstream users of PVC, primarily small and medium-sized private 
companies, were hit hard by the AD measure. Two of the three largest PVC consumers, including 
two private companies and one medium-sized SOE, have seen their sales and profits plunge.  
Nearly half of the other companies have turned from profitable to loss making (Shen et al. 2005).   
Despite the hardship by the downstream PVC users during the five years of imposition of AD 
tariffs on imported PVC, eight Chinese PVC producers, all of which are large SOEs, requested an 
extension of the AD measure.  The MOFCOM launched an AD sunset review in September 2008.   30 
 
One year later, MOFCOM extended the AD duties for another five years, claiming that the 
domestic PVC industry would otherwise be injured.  The underlying cause was a dramatic drop in 
oil prices which undercut the price competitiveness of China’s coal-based calcium carbine PVC and 
encouraged downstream industries to import ethylene-based PVC at far lower cost.  
Comparatively, the lesson here is not that Beijing is disinterested in the making of a highly 
integrated value-added steel industry, but rather until able to do so, foregoes protectionism for its 
own sake to meet broader development goals.  The patterning of AD cases in China, as such, is 
irreducible to the matter of unmet demand, or need for specific imports.  After all, China has long 
had shortfalls in most petrochemicals critical to manufacturing and infrastructure improvements.  
Lack of AD actions even by lead SOEs in the steel industry instead reflects the current 
status of downstream industries in broader development plans.  That is, with the shift away from 
import substitution, the Chinese government has married its goal of creating national champions 
with a willingness to gain advantage through global partnerships and foreign direct investment in 
core sectors, including automobiles and aircraft.  This marriage is the real disadvantage for the steel 
industry, still fragmented and without a heavy concentration of key national corporations to 
counter-balance the very same that dominate in the downstream.  Moreover, with steel-consuming 
industries such as automotive, construction, and electronics identified as pillar industries in the 
Eighth and Ninth FYP (1991-2000), they are guaranteed to receive wide-ranging government 
support.  
The current global economic crisis may, of course, change things.  The sharp decline in 
steel prices and export opportunities is producing a situation for Chinese steel somewhat identical 
to what hit the oil industry in the late 1990s.  The Baosteel Group, for example, experienced a 32 
percent drop in net profits in 2008 (Reuter 2009).  In March 2009, the State Council unveiled a plan 
for “reinvigorating the steel industry,” calling for restricting capacity in the steel sector as a top 31 
 
reform priority and intensifying a campaign for industry consolidation (Xinhua 2009).  With this, 
we are also seeing a rise in mergers and acquisitions.  
The petrochemical industry, in contrast, has managed to capture the spillover effects of a 
decade’s worth of effort to ensure a growing home market for its products.  The downstream 
industries, comprised of specialty companies that rely on these ingredients for use in consumable 
products directed toward distinct markets, have been affiliated with or become more dependent on 
the upstream conglomerates.  Foreign direct investment in the petrochemicals industry, in turn, has 
increased, laying the groundwork for China to have what gave the U.S., Taiwan, Japan, and Korea a 
considerable competitive edge from the 1960s.  To the extent that China succeeds in this endeavor, 
it will have moved a bit closer to its goal of improved national and economic security.  Until then, 
its manufacturing base depends heavily on imports for critical intermediate petrochemical products, 
leaving China still something of an economic giant on clay feet. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we set out to explain patterns of AD petitions in China over the past decade.  
We focused on the political economy of economic restructuring in China and its effect on the 
distribution of power within domestic production chains.  We argue that the interaction effect of 
exogenous economic shocks and national industrial policy intentions go some way toward 
explaining why the petrochemical sector has come to dominate AD cases in China.   Specifically, 
we found that when national economic restructuring plans are thwarted, the consequences extend 
to how the central government is likely to respond to demands for protection, even from SOEs.  
Looking at the political economy of economic restructuring from this angle allows us as well to 
makes clear that national industrial policy does not end with implementation of trade liberalization 
policies.  To the contrary, it may very well benefit from them, and in surprising ways.  32 
 
                                                
  Given this, the common dichotomies that define international political economy 
explanations of firm policy preferences, ones that emphasize either domestic or international 
factors, material or non-material conditions, seem insufficient to explain government-business 
relations in China today.   Focusing instead on the interaction effects between these realms, we are 
able to paint a picture of economic transformation in China that centers around tensions between 
the central government’s intention of strengthening pillar industries and  comparable weaknesses 
which result from local government and industry interests to forestall the very same.  
Traditional developmental state literature tends to focus on how national governments 
affect the development of firms.  Our paper suggests that even for a country, such as China, with a 
strong feature of state intervention, domestic firms can determine industrial policy outcomes. We 
show that due to on-going, conflicting interests between the central and local governments, 
dependence on SOEs as a growth strategy may ultimately constrain Beijing’s ability to meet national 
development goals, a seemingly counterintuitive finding.
16  
The last observation is particularly useful in the China context.  Changing the identity of 
state-owned enterprises through shifting factory manager incentives, privatization, mergers and 
acquisitions, and critical changes in the state bureaucracy has been at the heart of the Chinese 
government’s industrial policies of the past three decades.   Our recognition that economic interests 
are, as a result, not structural in origin allows that political context will have a role to play in shaping 
firm strategy in the years ahead.  
 
16 Note that our explanation of the distinct outcomes of industrial consolidation is different from Huang (2002), who 
argues that China’s divided and decentralized bureaucratic arrangement played a key role in the failed consolidation 
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 Table 1: Antidumping Cases in Petrochemical and Steel Industries (1998-2009) 
 














Cases 119  153  9  153 
Percentage 66%  22%  5%  22% 
Petitioners 42  (61%)    6(100%)   
SOEs  37 (54%)    6 (100%)   
National Key 





of top Four 
companies 
24 (Sinopec 10; 
CNPC 9; 
Sinochem 5) 




Source: estimate based on Global Antidumping Database (Bown 2010). 
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Petroleum Chemical   
2008 
Export  16% 21% 
Import  5% 24% 
2007 
Export  17% 23% 
Import  7% 31% 
2006 
 
Export  8% 9%  15% 
Import  6% 47%  22% 
2005 
 
Export  6% 12%  16% 
Import  10% 44%  25% 
2004 
 
Export  6% 13%  16% 
Import  12% 45%  27% 
2003 
 
Export  3% 15%  17% 
Import  18% 39%  28% 
2002 
 
Export  3% 15%  17% 
Import  17% 33%  28% 
2001 
 
Export  3% 15%  17% 
Import  16% 32%  25% 
2000 
 
Export  6% 15%  17% 
Import  17% 39%  26% 
 
Note: Export dependency is calculated as export divided by total output; import dependency is calculated as import 
divided by total output. 
Source: Industrial output data from China Yearly Industrial Data 2000-2008; Import/export data before 2007 from 
China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook 2002-2007. Export/import information of 2007 and 2008 









Coking and Nuclear Fuel 
Processing 
Raw Chemical Material & 
Chemical Products 
Smelting & Pressing of 
Ferrous Metals 
No. Province  Market 
Share (%)  Province  Market 
Share (%)  Province  Market 
Share (%) 
1 Shandong  13.28  Jiangsu  19.55 Henan  11.17 
2 Liaoning  12.28  Shandong  17.22 Jiangsu  10.51 
3 Guangdong  8.47  Guangdong 9.09 Shandong  9.68 
4 Shanxi  6.43  Zhejiang 7.74 Guangdong  8.56 
5 Shanghai  5.39  Shanghai 5.61 Jiangxi  8.44 
6 Hebei  5.13  Henan  4.22 Zhejiang 6.76 
7 Zhejiang  4.92  Liaoning  3.39 Hunan  5.21 
8  Jiangsu 4.63  Hebei 3.25 Yunnan  3.93 
9 Heilongjiang  4.35  Sichuan  3.06
Inner 
Mongolia 3.83 
10 Shaanxi  4.09  Hubei  2.88 Liaoning  3.58 
Top 5    46.15    59.23   48.36 
Top 10    69.27    76.03   71.67 
Source: China Yearly Industry Data 2008, access through China Data Online 41 
 
Table 4: Industry Structures of Steel and Petrochemical Industries (1999-2008) 
 




























1999 12,325  3,859  763 66% n.a. 3,042 686  409.7 74% 31%
2000 12,423  3,215  1,017.80 68% n.a. 2,997 577 473.3  74% 32%
2001 13,058  2,588  1,089.20 65% 78% 3,176 490 570.7  72% 29%
2002 13,781  2,142  1,200.50 60% 79% 3,333 409 649.2  67% 25%
2003 15,126  1,661  1,548.00 58% 74% 4,119 698 1,000.70  59% 21%
2004 20,778  1,577  2,187.90 54% 66% 7,141 345 1,694.90  53% 19%
2005 20,706  1,108  2,836.00 51% 63% 6,649 225 2,147.10  47% 18%
2006 22,875  909  3,559.80 49% 57% 6,999 199 2,540.40  43% 21%
2007 25,130  689  4,465.00 46% 59% 7,161 162 3,370.30  42% 20%
2008 30,640  658  5,594.50 44% 58% 8,012 149 4,565.87  44% 22%
Source: China Yearly Industrial Data 1999-2008. The petrochemical industry includes petroleum processing and raw 
chemical materials & chemical products.  
For the steel industry, the CR4 ratios (shares of top four companies in total output) for 1999-2004 are from Sun 2007, 
CR4 ratio for 2005-08 from China Steel Report, Metallurgical Industry Information Center. The list of the top four 
steelmakers varies over time, largely because that some large state-led mergers in recent years have significantly changed 
the market structure. In 2008, the top four firms (in terms of steel output) are Baosteel (Shanghai), Hebei, Anben 
(Liaoning), and Wusteel (Hubei). 
For the petrochemical industry, Top four companies are Sinopec, CNPC, Sinochem, and CNOOC. The sources of 
revenues of the four companies include petroleum and natural gas extraction and other sectors, which makes their 
share in the petrochemical sector larger than the share of total SOEs. Company Revenue information is 





Table 5: Domestic Input-Output ratios (1995-2002) 
 




Chemicals  0.052 0.046  0.024 0.021
Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous   0.097 n.a.  n.a. 0.059
Chemicals   Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  0.065 0.071  0.055 0.058
Wood and products of wood and cork  0.067 0.040  0.050 0.056
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  0.055 0.045  0.045 0.051
Pharmaceuticals  0.049 0.062  0.067 n.a.
Rubber & plastics products  0.187 0.208  0.210 0.226
Iron & Steel  Fabricated metal products  0.232 0.252  0.209 0.304
Machinery & equipment  0.135 0.160  0.102 0.159
Electrical machinery & apparatus  0.041 0.040  0.021 0.107
Medical, precision & optical instruments  0.056 0.066  0.046 0.076
Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers  0.079 0.066  0.070 0.083
Building & repairing of ships & boats  0.135 0.129  0.108 0.090
Railroad equipment & transport equipment  0.073 0.082  0.074 n.a.
Construction  0.091 0.076  0.051 0.071
 
Note: Input-output ratio is the proportion of domestic intermediate products of the upstream industries in producing 
outputs of the downstream industries. The higher the ratio, the more integrated the two industries. 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) compiles benchmark tables every 5 years and annual tables in the midpoint 
between benchmark years. The 1997 and 2002 tables are benchmark tables; 1995 and 2000 tables and annual tables.  
 
Source: Calculated based on Input-Output Tables of China (1995, 1997, 2000, 2002), retrieved from OECD Input-




Table 6: Industrial Breakdown of National Key SOEs (2009) 
 
Total 394
Steel Industry  33
Petrochemical Industry  46
Steel Downstream Industries  103
Petrochemical Downstream Industries  43
 
Source: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/wzlj/wzlj_zdqy.htm  
Note: Steel downstream sectors include automobile, construction, electronics, machinery, and 
heavy equipment companies. 




Table 7: Summary of Mergers in the Steel Industry (2005-2009) 
 
Finished merger  Failed merger
Intra-provincial (mergers)  
•  Anshan and Benxi (Liaoning) 
•  Tangshan and Handan (Hebei);  
•  Jinan and Laiwu (Shandong); 
Intra-provincial 
Inter-provincial (acquisitions) 
•  2006: Baosteel (Shanghai) with Bayi Steel 
(Xinjiang) 
•  2008: Baosteel with Shaoguan and 
Guangzhou (Guangdong);  
•  Wuhan with Liuzhou (Guangxi) and Kumin 
(Yunnan) 
Inter-provincial (mergers)
•  Baosteel with Handan (Hebei), 
Ma’anshan (Anhui), Baotao (Inner 
Mongolia) 






   
 




Source: Global prices data from http://www.econstats.com/rt_steel.htm 
Chinese prices data from http://www.mysteel.net/myspic.html.   
Note: Chinese prices data were originally measured as index with July 2000 as the benchmark point 100. We use July 
2004 average prices for hot-rolled coils in the Chinese market (RMB 4189 per ton) as a benchmark to transform the 
index into actual prices. Exchange rates data from http://www.chinability.com/Rmb.htm. 
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